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COMMUNICATIONS 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN MUNICIPALITIES* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A substantial number of all municipalities 
in the United States employ a city-manager 
as the principal operating officer rather than 
an elected mayor or set of elected commis- 
sioners.' If municipalities employ city-man- 
agers to improve the economic perform- 
ance2 of local government, one might expect 
that the compensation of city-managers 
would encourage such efficiencies. That is, 
ceteris paribus, the more efficient the munici- 
pal government the higher we would expect 
the salary of the city-manager to be. If the 
compensation structure of city-managers 
does not provide managers with such finan- 
cial incentives, we believe it reasonable to 
deduce that the council-manager form of 
government is not inherently more efficient 
than the alternative forms of local govern- 
ment. 
In this paper we are concerned with the 
salaries of three important municipal offi- 
cials; city-managers, police chiefs, and fire 
chiefs. We present a model that relates the 
salaries of these officials to a set of ex- 
planatory variables, the most important 
being measures associated with job perform- 
ance. Two of these measures of performance 
are developed in the study. Further, the in- 
fluence of the city-manager form of govern- 
ment on the incentive structure facing police 
chiefs and fire chiefs, and the inter- 
dependence betwen the salaries of police 
chiefs and fire chiefs is investigated. The 
model is tested using cross-section data for 
1967. 
Related Literature 
There is an expanding literature theo- 
retically analyzing the behavior of public of- 
ficials, both elected and appointed.3 The cru- 
cial assumption in these studies is that the 
officeholder seeks to maximize his own util- 
ity through the actions he takes while in of- 
fice. In order to exercise control over these 
actions without having to employ costly 
evaluation procedures, the people selecting 
the officeholders must structure the rewards 
in certain ways. Specifically the incentives 
must be such that actions desired by these 
people are also those actions that will lead to 
maximization of the officeholder's utility 
function.4 
* Our research has been supported by the Center for 
Urban Affairs of Northwestern University, and the 
Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. 
Helpful comments from an anonymous referee, Robert 
Masson of the Department of Justice, and Mark Pauly, 
John Ledyard, and Robert Lineberry of Northwestern 
University are gratefully acknowledged. 
1 The city-manager plan has two basic components: 
an elected council limited by function to legislative mat- 
ters and an appointed executive responsible for adminis- 
tration of the city. The city-manager has considerable 
autonomy in preparing budgets, and in the hiring and 
firing of personnel. In 1967 over 40 percent of cities with 
a population over 5,000 had a city-manager form of 
government. Only in the two size classifications 'under 
10,000 people' and 'over 500,000 people', did-less than 
40 percent have a city-manager. 
2 In a general sense the performance of government is 
measured by the quantity and quality of services pro- 
vided by governments. Unfortunately nowhere is meas- 
urement of performance more difficult than for services 
and especially the services of the public sector. For an 
excellent discussion of problems in this area see the 
paper by Mancur Olson, "Evaluating Performance in 
the Public Sector," the comments by C. L. Schultze, and 
the response by Olson in Moss (1973). Further the 
March 1974 issue of Social Science Quarterly (Volume 
54) is a special issue which deals with problems of 
"Measuring Urban Agency Output and Performance." 
3 See Downs [19671, Tullock [1965], Niskanen [1971], 
Becker and Stigler [1972], Barro [1973], McKean [1972], 
Alchian and Demsetz [1972]. 
'Becker and Stigler [1972] is an example in law 
enforcement. If the compensation of an enforcer is 
structured so that his lifetime expected income from 
carrying out his duties with no malfeasance exceeds the 
alternatives available through malfeasance, then it is in 
his interests to enforce the laws and to ignore illegal 
inducements to 'overlook' certain criminal activities. 
937 
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There is no empirical work directly testing 
this approach for public officials. The rela- 
tionship of earnings of corporate bureau- 
crats to firm performance has been analyzed 
however, and the results support the ap- 
proach outlined above. Firms that relate 
compensation of executives to firm perform- 
ance tend to perform better.5 
II. DETERMINANTS OF CITY-MANAGER, POLICE 
AND FIRE CHIEF SALARIES 
A. City Managers 
We assume that the maximand of the city- 
manager is the personal rewards from office, 
his salary for example.6 
In turn salary may be thought to be de- 
termined by two broad types of variables; 
(i) productivity or job performance and 
(ii) difficulty of the job. 
The performance measures are of primary 
interest and we discuss them first. They in- 
clude: job experience of the city-manager 
measured by the number of previous city- 
manager positions held, seniority measured 
by number of years at the current job, status 
in the ICMA, and current property tax and 
budget performance.. City-managers are a 
relatively mobile class. Those who are success- 
ful tend to start in smaller cities, and move 
on to larger cities.7 Less successful city- 
managers, those whose performance does 
not satisfy local citizens, tend to change 
locations but stay in smaller cities. Con- 
sequently we employ two separate job ex- 
perience variables in the analysis. The first 
(second) equals the number of previous 
manager positions if the city-manager is 
currently in a city with less than (greater 
than) 50,000 people and zero otherwise. 
Salary is expected to be negatively related 
to the first and positively related to the 
second measure of job experience. 
Seniority is directly related to the way the 
city-manager performs his job. Presumably 
the longer he has been at his current job the 
more productive he is in the usual sense of 
providing output more efficiently. There is 
an additional dimension however that is 
quite important. Both Kammerer et al. 
[1962] and Loveridge [1971] find that city- 
manager tenure is lower if the city-manager 
is not responsive to local politicians. Length 
of time on the job, then, is also an indication 
of his ability to get along with the elected 
municipal officials. We postulate that salary 
will be positively related to seniority. 
Membership or associate membership in 
the ICMA by an individual indicates that he 
has served for a period of time in one of the 
municipalities or councils of governments 
listed by the ICMA. It is a statement by the 
ICMA that this person is a recognized pro- 
fessional city-manager. This is analogous to 
a certificate of competence in his area. Two 
binary variables are used to account for 
status in the ICMA. The first (second) takes 
the value one if the individual is a member 
(associate member) of the ICMA and zero 
otherwise. We postulate that the manager's 
salary will be positively related to his status 
in the ICMA. 
The final measures of performance, which 
are developed in this study, are concerned 
with total expenditures and property taxes of 
the municipality. We assume that local citi- 
zens are interested in the level of services 
provided in their community relative to 
other communities, and in the cost of these 
services relative to other communities. The 
See Masson [1971] for example. The advantage these 
studies have over related work on government manage- 
rial compensation is the availability of measures of firm 
performance. Profits, sales, and equity performance are 
well-defined concepts. 
6 The current dollar salary as reported by the Inter- 
national City Managers' Association (ICMA) is used as 
the dependent variable. The variation in real earnings 
across areas is discussed below. If the non-monetary 
rewards of office are significant, and do not vary across 
cities in the same manner as salaries, then use of salary 
as the dependent variable will lead to serious measure- 
ment error reducing the accuracy of our results. A sim- 
ilar caveat applies if monetary rewards exclusive of sal- 
ary (future income due to current contracts developed, 
for example) are significant and not highly correlated 
with reported salaries. 
7 See Loveridge [1971], Kammerer et. al. [1962], and 
Floro [1955] for detailed discussions of city-manager 
mobility patterns. 
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most evident manifestation of the level of 
services is the size of the municipal budget. 
Although total spending by itself does not 
necessarily meet popular demands for serv- 
ices, most voters feel that the level of ex- 
penditures is a good indicator of the level of 
services being provided." Further, property 
taxes are seen as the major cost of these 
services.9 Accordingly, two measures of rel- 
ative performance were examined: per capita 
property taxes and per capita total ex- 
penditures. Two regressions were estimated 
with property taxes per capita and total ex- 
penditures per capita as the dependent varia- 
bles.10 These equations were used to predict 
expenditures per capita and property taxes 
per capita for each community. Manager 
performance was then measured by the dif- 
ference between the actual and predicted 
value divided by the actual value. 
The hypothesized relationship between 
these variables and manager salary is 
straightforward. In order to maximize his 
personal rewards the manager will push for a 
larger budget, since, holding property tax 
performance constant, a larger budget is in- 
terpreted as a higher level of services being 
provided. The manager does not have suf- 
ficient information on the public interest to 
provide the exact level and mix of services 
that would be optimal. However the larger 
the budget, the more services he can provide, 
and hence, the more likely he is to satisfy 
most of the local population. There is also 
pressure from within the administration to 
expand the budget. The larger the budget, 
the more jobs the manager can provide and 
the more promotion possibilities as well. 
This will give him good relations with his 
administration, and provide members of it 
with little incentive to frustrate his policies so 
as to get him removed from office." Hence 
we postulate that salary is positively related 
to the budget performance variable. 
Clearly the city-manager does face budget 
limitations, the most obvious of which is the 
income and debt of the community capacity. 
Moreover there is pressure from other com- 
munities. Voters compare the budget, the 
level of property taxes and their notion of 
services provided with similar data from 
other communities. If his relative perform- 
ance is poor, his salary will suffer and he may 
lose his job. Thus we postulate that salary 
will be negatively related to our measure of 
property tax performance. 
Finally, we relate salary to characteristics 
of the city which reflect the difficulty of the 
job and the resources available to pay his 
salary. Population size and the percentage of 
nonwhites in the city are proxy variables for 
the complexity of the job facing the city- 
manager. Salary is expected to be positively 
related to both variables. Further, two 
binary variables are employed to distinguish 
among central cities, suburban cities and in- 
dependent cities, the latter being the refer- 
ence group. These variables will account for 
systematic differences among these political 
units which may affect city-manager salaries. 
8 See Sharkansky [1970], Niskanen [1971], and Tullock 
[1965] for variations of this approach. Baumol and 
Quandt [1964] argue that rules of thumb can be efficient 
economic strategies under conditions of imperfect infor- 
mation when decision-making is costly. It can be argued 
that citizens use the budget, and the level of property 
taxes as rule-of-thumb indicators of what level of serv- 
ices is being provided and at what cost. 
9 While property taxes are the major source of local 
revenue, they are not the only source. Municipalities 
also derive income from sales taxes, income taxes, inter- 
governmental transfers, fees, profits from municipal cor- 
porations, and interest on invested municipal funds. 
What the citizen wants is to minimize local contribu- 
tions to the budget. We did attempt to estimate an 
equation to predict intergovernmental transfers, but no 
statistically significant equation could be calculated. 
Further the burden of sales taxes, income taxes, and fees 
was not clear. We therefore relied on property taxes as 
our indicator of costs. 
1o Ideally these equations should be estimated simulta- 
neously since property taxes per capita and total ex- 
penditures (or budget) per capita are simultaneously 
determined. The system could not be identified. Re- 
duced Form estimates of each equation are presented in 
Table I of the Appendix. 
" See Niskanen [1971] for a more extensive presenta- 
tion of these arguments. It is possible to interpret the 
budget performance variable another way. If the actual 
budget per capita exceeds the 'predicted' value, this 
could mean that the city-manager spends more to pro- 
vide the same output. This would be a sign of in- 
efficiency, and his salary should then be negatively re- 
lated to budget performance. 
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An additional binary variable accounts for 
cost-of-living differences between the South 
and the non-South.12 We expect the sign of 
the coefficient to be negative. Finally, we 
employ median house value within the com- 
munity as a measure of ability-to-pay. 
The data are drawn from unpublished files 
of the ICMA for 1967, from the 1960 Census 
of Population, and the 1967 Census of Gov- 
ernments for a sample of cities with popu- 
lations greater than 25,000 people. The data 
for the salary and characteristics of the city- 
managers are drawn from ICMA files. The 
information concerning population, median 
house value, and percentage non-white are 
based on the 1960 Census of Population. 
Finally, the performance measures are based 
on both the Census of Government and the 
Census of Population.'3,14 
The results of the regressions which relate 
salary to the explanatory variables in a 
simple linear form are presented in Table I. 
TABLE I 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CITY MANAGER SALARY 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Budget Performance 1750.111 365.42 
Property tax performance - 6.113 4.27 
Previous Positions (a) - 127.551 50.83 
(b) 321.142 161.41 
Years at current job 206.081 38.22 
Manager Status in ICMA 529.30 886.71 
Associate Manager Status -1105.45 1018.62 
Population (000's) 27.631 2.07 
Percent nonwhite 45.681 19.85 
Median House Value 0.271 .05 
South -1713.85 442.21 
Central City 1441.281 560.76 
Suburb 1333.771 533.97 
Constant 11,660.961 1072.18 
N = 289 
R' = 0.63 
F = 35.32 
1. Significant at the 1 percent confidence level using a 
one-tailed test. 
2. Significant at the 5 percent confidence level using a 
one-tailed test. 
3. Significant at the 10 percent confidence level using 
a one-tailed test. 
With the exception of the coefficients of the 
ICMA status variables, which are statist- 
ically insignificantly different from zero, all 
the coefficients have the expected signs. City- 
manager salary is positively related to the 
budget performance variable and negatively 
related to the property tax performance vari- 
able as postulated.'5 In a city, where the 
property tax performance variable is one 
standard deviation below the mean for the 
sample, the city-manager receives 260 dollars 
more than the city-manager in a city in which 
property tax performance is average. Sim- 
ilarly if the budget performance variable is 
one standard deviation above the sample 
mean, he receives 875 dollars more than the 
12 The South is defined to include Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, West Virginia, District of Columbia, Alabama, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, Texas. 
"s The dependent variable and other independent vari- 
ables are based on 1967 data. Since the relevant (1967) 
value of the population, median house value, and per- 
centage nonwhite variables are related to the observed 
(1960) values with measurement error, one can show 
under standard assumptions that the regression 
coefficients of these variables will be inconsistent esti- 
mates of the true values. (See Theil [1971], pp. 607-615) 
We are also assuming that the city-manager's salary in 
1967 is determined after the 1967 performance measures 
are known. Ideally we would like to look at how differ- 
ent city-manager's salaries very over time in response to 
changes in the relative performance of their cities. The 
performance variables however are from the Census of 
Government which is published every five years. 
14 "In a comparative perspective, the overwhelming 
evidence is that 'general municipal expenditures' is a 
two-dimension variable representing both the degree of 
functional inclusiveness and the level of municipal per- 
formance in the provision of public services." (Liebert 
(1974), p. 770.) The most obvious examples, but cer- 
tainly not the only ones, of services for which legal 
responsibility varies are public education and public 
welfare. Our data do not permit identification of the 
legal responsibility assigned to each city for each service. 
We use total expenditures and total property taxes as 
reported by the Census of Government, recognizing the 
model specification problems due to this fragmentation 
of legal responsibility. 
15 When the same regression is calculated using salary 
defleted for cost of living differences across cities, as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient of the binary variable 
for the South is statistically insignificantly different from 
zero. Otherwise the results do not change. Similarly, the 
results are qualitatively the same when the natural loga- 
rithm of salary is used as the dependent variable. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE I 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA AND PROPERTY TAX PER CAPITA REGRESSIONSI'l 
Total Expenditure Per Capita Property Tax Per Capita 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Population (000's) 0.20 (.05) 0.09 (0.02) 
[Population (000's)]2 - 0.09X10-3 (.04X10-3) - 0.05X10-3 (0.01X10-3) 
Median House Value 0.02X10-1 (0.O1XI0- ) 0.02X101 (0.03X10-2) 
Percent Nonwhite 0.49 (0.39) 0.27 (0.13) 
Central City -16.98 (10.76) - 4.61 (3.46) 
Suburb -34.88 (11.15) - 4.27 (3.59) 
New England[2] 102.86 (15.46) 73.94 (4.98) 
South Atlantic -52.37 (12.42) -44.91 (4.02) 
East North Atlantic -61.10 (16.48) -52.10 (5.33) 
East South Atlantic -11.99 (15.25) -43.53 (5.18) 
West North Central 75.69 (20.06) -59.71 (6.49) 
West South Central -76.89 (15.93) -57.48 (5.32) 
Mountain -70.79 (20.29) -62.79 (6.64) 
Pacific -44.09 (14.06) -58.74 (4.86) 
Constant 160.81 (17.96) 58.03 (5.80) 
R2 = 0.29 F= 18.37 N = 656 
R2 = 0.66 F = 81.48 N = 656 
[1] The variables presented in Table I are those which yield the best overall results. Other variables used in early 
calculations but not entered in the final regressions include; median income, percent of the population with 
greater than $10,000 income, median education, and percent of the population under 18. The simple correlation 
between median house value and median income, in the sample, is 0.82. 
[2] The reference group for the set of regional binary variables is the Middle Atlantic. 
city-manager in a city in which the perform- 
ance is average, cet. par.16 
Although the coefficients of these two vari- 
ables have the predicted signs, the results 
indicate that population, and job experience 
are the most important explanatory variables. 
As argued above the job experience varia- 
bles are important measures of performance, 
and it is clear then that good performance 
leads to a higher salary. The "previous 
positions" variables for example, support 
the hypothesis that the more successful city- 
managers tend to change locations moving 
among larger cities. They are rewarded for 
perceived performance in their past jobs by 
their existing employers. Movement among 
smaller cities on the other hand would ap- 
pear to be an indication of poor perform- 
ance, and compensation is structured to 
reflect this. 
B. Police and Fire Chiefs 
We now examine the determinants of po- 
lice and fire chiefs' salaries. The current dol- 
lar salaries of the two, as reported by the 
ICMA for 1967, are used as dependent varia- 
bles in separate regressions, one for fire 
chiefs, the other for police chiefs. 
Since there are no data available on the 
personal characteristics of these municipal 
executives, the explanatory variables we uti- 
1" The mean of the property tax performance variable 
is 
-2.78; the standard deviation, 42.51. The mean of the 
budget performance variable is -0.20; the standard de- 
viation, 0.50. The average city-manager salary in the 
sample is 19,870 dollars. 
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lize can be divided into only two classes; job 
performance and characteristics of the city. 
The measures of performance for fire and 
police chiefs are similar to those used for 
city-managers. For the police department, a 
measure of performance based on the crime 
index reported by the FBI was calculated; for 
the fire department, one based on the city 
ratings used for insurance purposes."1 
To derive the measure of police depart- 
ment performance, we first estimated a regr- 
ession with the crime index as the dependent 
variable. The measure of performance is then 
the actual crime index minus the predicted 
crime index divided by the actual crime index 
for the city in question. Similarly, a regres- 
sion was calculated with the fire insurance 
classification as the dependent variable." 
The measure of performance of the fire de- 
partment is the actual fire insurance classifi- 
cation minus the predicted fire insurance 
classification divided by the actual classifica- 
tion. The salary of the police chief (fire chief) 
is expected to be positively related to the 
performance of his department, that is, nega- 
tively related to the constructed performance 
variable. 
The variables describing the city are iden- 
tical to those used in the previous section, 
with the addition of a binary variable taking 
the value one if there is a city-manager form 
of government, and a binary variable taking 
the value one if there is a commission form 
of government. The reference group for these 
two binary variables is the mayoral city. 
These variables are entered to control for 
differences among forms of government. 
While the sample of cities analyzed above 
was restricted to those with a city-manager 
form of government, we extend our analysis 
of fire and police chiefs to include mayoral 
and commission forms of government. Con- 
sequently we are able to test whether the re- 
lationship between the compensation of the 
police (fire) chief and the performance of his 
department is affected by the form of govern- 
ment. There are two variables for each re- 
gression. In the police (fire) chief regression 
the first interaction variable equals the con- 
structed police (fire) department performance 
variable if the city has the city-manager form 
of government and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
the second variable equals the constructed 
police (fire) department performance variable 
if the city has the commission form of gov- 
ernment and zero otherwise. If the coefficient 
of the first (second) interaction variable is 
negative, while the coefficient of the perform- 
ance variable alone is statistically insig- 
nificant, we can infer that the city-manager 
(commission) form of government provides 
an incentive for the police (fire) chief to im- 
prove his department's performance, while 
the mayoral form of government does not. 
This suggests that the city-manager (commis- 
sion) form of government is more effective in 
improving the performance of the police and 
fire departments. If both the interaction 
variable and the performance variable alone 
have negative signs, then we can infer only 
that the city-manager (commission) form of 
government provides a higher marginal re- 
ward for improvements in the performance 
of the police (fire) department. Finally if the 
interaction variable has no significant effect, 
while the performance variable alone has a 
negative coefficient, then the city-manager 
(commission) and mayoral forms of govern- 
ment provide the same incentives to the po- 
lice (fire) chief to improve the performance 
of his department. 
Ordinary least squares regressions were es- 
timated for police chiefs and fire chiefs sepa- 
17 The crime index has been used by Votey and Phillips 
[1973] in a study of the effectiveness of police activity, 
and by Ehrlich [1973] in a study of the deterrent effect of 
criminal law enforcement. As is well known, this index is 
subject to substantial measurement error across cities. 
Ahlbrandt [1973] in his study of the efficiency of fire 
departments uses cost per capita as his dependent vari- 
able. He uses an index based on the fire insurance classi- 
fication to reflect quality differences between fire depart- 
ments. A city's rating is poorer the more points it has. 
Points of deficiency are assessed against a city when 
conditions are below standards prescribed in a schedule 
set up by the American Insurance Association. Both the 
crime indices and the fire insurance classifications are 
provided by the ICMA for 1967. 
18 The underlying regressions for the crime index and 
the fire insurance classification are reported in Table II 
of the Appendix. 
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rately. The results are presented in Table II. 
The salary of the police chief is negatively 
related to our police department perform- 
ance variable, as hypothesized.'9 The form 
of government however, does not affect this 
relationship; that is, the coefficients of the 
interaction variables are not statistically sig- 
nificant. In the case of the fire chief, on the 
other hand, the form of government is im- 
portant. The salary of the fire chief is nega- 
tively related to the fire department's per- 
formance in city-manager cities only. There 
is no statistically significant relationship be- 
tween the fire department's performance and 
the fire chief's salary under the mayoral or 
commission form of government. 
C. Interdependence of Police and Fire Chief 
Salaries 
Due to the nature of municipal politics, 
and the similarity of these two jobs it is rea- 
sonable to expect that the police chief's and 
fire chief's salaries will be interdependent. To 
test this hypothesis a two-equation system 
was estimated by three stage least squares. 
The reduced form estimates of these equa- 
tions are presented in Table III; the struc- 
tural coefficients, in Table IV. 
In the reduced form equations, presented 
19 
'Performance' in all cases means the performance 
variable constructed in this study. 
TABLE II 
POLICE AND FIRE CHIEF SALARY REGRESSIONS 
(Ordinary Least Squares Assuming Independence From Other Category's Salary) 
Police Chief Results Fire Chief Results 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Performance of Police Dept. - 640.282 (336.37) Not included 
Performance of Fire Dept. Not included 41.66 (376.21) 
(Performance of Police Dept.)X 
(City Mgr. Binary Variable) - 194.52 (422.36) Not included 
(Performance of Fire Dept.)X 
(City Manager Binary Variable) Not included - 868.262 (402.21) 
(Performance of Police Dept.)X 
(Commission Binary Variable) -1235.90 (857.13) Not included 
(Performance of Fire Dept.)X -1047.80 (942.41) 
(Commission Binary Variable) Not included 
Population (000's) 11.441 (1.21) 9.541 (2.50) 
Percent Nonwhite - 20.46 (19.48) -5.47 (20.39) 
Median House Value 0.201 (0.05) 0.151 (0.05) 
South -1017.602 (542.78) - 919.463 (576.84) 
Central City 1550.401 (503.83) 1721.901 (541.81) 
Suburb 1205.552 (543.13) 1298.802 (572.33) 
City Manager Form of Govt. 3438.301 (404.41) 2683.201 (481.65) 
Commissioner Form of Govt. 1314.002 (695.62) 773.81 (800.63) 
Constant 4380.601 (773.48) 4699.101 (814.38) 
R2 = 0.37 R2 = 0.30 N = 465 
F = 24.34 F = 17.26 
1. Significant at the 1 percent confidence level using a one-tailed test. 
2. Significant at the 5 percent confidence level using a one-tailed test. 
3. Significant at the 10 percent confidence level using a one-tailed test. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE II 
CRIME INDEX AND FIRE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION REGRESSIONS 
Crime Index Fire Insurance Classification 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Population (000's) 36.12 (1.50) 0.80 (0.12) 
[Population (000's)]2 - 5.75 (9.05) 0.35 (0.78) 
Land Area (Square Miles) - 0.04 (0.02) Not included 
Population (000's) per Sq.Mi. Not included - 0.02XIO (0.03X10-2) 
Percent Nonwhite 15.58 (10.79) - 0.44 (0.99) 
Percent under 18 - 28.14 (20.93) 3.80 (2.33) 
Median Education -230.47 (130.28) Not included 
Percent with Greater than 
10,000 Income 13.47 (15.26) Not included 
Percent of Single Family 
Units Owner Occupied Not included 2.49 (1.09) 
Median House Value Not included - 0.53X10-2 (0.25X10-2) 
Central City Not included -116.81 (25.10) 
Suburb Not included - 44.35 (28.67) 
New England -148.66 (1047.20) - 67.67 (95.22) 
South Atlantic -512.42 (341.00) - 26.51 (31.06) 
East North Central 213.97 (392.26) 16.13 (33.46) 
East South Central 488.49 (365.82) - 42.63 (33.47) 
West North Central 6.43 (496.03) 3.03 (44.58) 
West South Central 194.56 (527.53) 64.20 (45.33) 
Mountain 686.45 (466.38) 54.41 (40.69) 
Pacific 722.76 (300.30) -172.83 (26.30) 
Constant 2261.80 (1572.30) 576.39 (97.36) 
R2 = 0.86 F= 171.23 N = 465 
R2 = 0.43 F = 21.29 N = 465 
in Table III, we see that in city-manager 
cities, the salaries of both municipal execu- 
tives are negatively related to the perform- 
ance of both departments. This highlights the 
interdependence between the salaries of the 
fire and police chiefs. Under the mayoral and 
commission forms of government however, 
the salaries of the two executives are nega- 
tively related to the police department per- 
formance variable only. Consequently, the 
form of government is a significant factor 
affecting the relationship between the sala- 
ries of the two municipal executives and the 
performance variables of their departments. 
Under the city-manager form of govern- 
ment, there is an incentive for these two mu- 
nicipal executives to improve the perform- 
ance of both departments. Under the other 
forms of government, there is an incentive to 
improve the performance of the police de- 
partment only. Finally in the structural 
equations presented in Table IV, the magni- 
tude of the interrelation between the salaries 
of the police chief and the fire chief can be 
seen. Ceteris paribus the fire chief's salary 
increases 89 cents for every I dollar increase 
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TABLE III 
POLICE AND FIRE CHIEF SALARY REGRESSIONS 
(Reduced Form Coefficients Assuming Interdependence with Other Chiefs Salary) 
Police Chief Results Fire Chief Results 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Performance of Police Dept. - 669.812 (336.03) - 843.251 (351.43) 
Performance of Fire Dept. 190.72 (357.82) 4.50 (374.22) 
(Performance of Police Dept.)X 
(City Mgr. Binary Variable) - 97.85 (424.32) 298.28 (443.78) 
(Performance of Fire Dept.)X 
(City Mgr. Binary Variable) - 794.292 (383.89) - 800.612 (401.49) 
(Performance of Police Dept.)X 
(Commission Binary Variable) -1106.60 (863.89) - 828.24 (903.49) 
(Performance of Fire Dept.)X 
(Commission Binary Variable) - 765.33 (900.91) - 785.61 (942.21) 
Population (000's) 12.081 (2.37) 9.091 (2.48) 
Percent Nonwhite - 23.30 (19.54) - 15.16 (20.44) 
Median House Value 0.201 (0.05) 0.141 (0.05) 
South - 867.853 (546.75) -1073.702 (571.82) 
Central City 1297.001 (515.94) 1804.401 (539.59) 
Suburb 1186.902 (541.57) 1283.802 (566.40) 
City Manager Form of Govt. 2985.701 (457.47) 2726.501 (478.45) 
Commissioner Form of Govt. 989.783 (766.93) 990.361 (802.08) 
Constant 4576.201 (775.63) 5013.301 (811.19) 
R2= 0.38 R2 = 0.32 N = 465 
F= 19.65 F= 14.84 
1. Significant at the 1 percent confidence level using a one-tailed test. 
2. Significant at the 5 percent confidence level using a one-tailed test. 
3. Significant at the 10 percent confidence level using a one-tailed test. 
in the police chiefs salary, while the police 
chiefs salary increases 85 cents for every 1 
dollar increase in the fire chiefs salary. 
III. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this study we investigated the relation- 
ship between the salaries of three important 
municipal executives, city managers, police 
chiefs and fire chiefs, and constructed meas- 
ures of their "performance". Our empirical 
results tend to support the hypothesis that 
the rewards received by these executives are 
positively related to our constructed meas- 
ures of their performance. Further, we found 
that the incentive structure designed to sup- 
port certain policy goals is affected by the 
form of government. The city-manager form 
of government provides salary rewards for 
less crime and improved fire department rat- 
ings; the mayoral and commission forms of 
government reward less crime. Clearly, fur- 
ther research would seek to identify other 
measures of performance which are related 
to the salaries of these executives. 
The empirical results for city-manager 
compensation are especially important be- 
cause of their relevance to the debate on the 
optimal organization of municipal govern- 
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TABLE IV 
POLICE AND FIRE CHIEF SALARY REGRESSIONS 
(Structural Coefficients Assuming Interdependence with Other Chiefs Salary) 
Police Chief Results Fire Chief Results 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Police Chief Salary Not included .89 (.14) 
Fire Chief Salary 0.85 (0.19) Not included 
Performance of Police Dept. -155.70 (203.26) Not included 
Performance of Fire Dept. Not included 0.49 (99.42) 
(Performance of Police Dept.)X 
(City Mgr. Binary Variable) - 31.38 (120.67) Not included 
(Performance of Fire Dept.)X Not included -185.77 (213.85) 
(Performance of Police Dept.)X 
(Commission Binary Variable) -272.37 (307.42) Not included 
(Performance of Fire Dept.)X 
(Commission Binary Variable) Not included -186.55 (303.63) 
Population (000's) 3.24 (1.97) - 0.71 (1.93) 
Percent Nonwhite - 9.23 (10.87) 4.33 (11.15) 
Median House Value 0.08 (0.04) - 0.04 (0.04) 
South 7.58 (379.04) -259.86 (326.59) 
Central City -237.45 (482.68) 652.93 (333.43) 
Suburb 67.46 (389.46) 252.35 (350.38) 
City Manager Form of Govt. 710.79 (652.76) 23.33 (474.00) 
Commissioner Form of Govt. 201.01 (453.91) 59.76 (422.44) 
Constant 339.39 (1018.50) 879.69 (737.71) 
ment. An important extension to our re- 
search would therefore be to mayoral reelec- 
tion data in mayor-council cities. Is the 
probability of reelection of the mayor in- 
fluenced by the same factors that affect the 
city manager's salary?20 If this probability is 
similarly influenced by these performance 
measures, there would then be no reason to 
expect cities run by city managers to have 
municipal services produced more efficiently 
than cities run by elected mayors. 
GERALD S. GOLDSTEIN 
Northwestern University 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG 
Cornell University 
REFERENCES 
1. Ahlbrandt, R., "Efficiency in the Provision of Fire 
Services," Public Choice, 16 (1973), 2-15. 
2. Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, H., "Production, In- 
formation Costs, and Economic Organization," 
American Economic Review, 62 (1972), 777-796. 
3. Barro, R., "The Control of Politicians: An Eco- 
nomic Model," Public Choice, 14 (1973), 1-42. 
4. Becker, G. S. and Stigler, G. J., "Law Enforcement, 
Corruption, and Compensation of Enforcers," Pre- 
pared for the Conference on Capitalism and Free- 
dom, Charlottesville, Va. (1972). 
5. Baumol, W. J. and Quandt, R. E., "Rules of Thumb 
and Optimally Imperfect Decisions," American 
Economic Review, 54 (1964), 23-46. 
6. Downs, A. Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1967). 
7. Ehrlich, I., "The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law 
Enforcement," Journal of Legal Studies, 1 (1973), 
259-277. 
8. Farrell, M. J., "The Measurement of Productive 
Efficiency," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
20 There are unfortunately no data currently available 
on mayoral reelections. 
COMMUNICATIONS 947 
Series A, 120 (1957), 253-281. 
9. Fisk, D. M. and Winne, R. E., "Output Measure- 
ment in Urban Government: Current Status and 
Likely Prospects," Social Science Quarterly, 
54(1974), 725-740. 
10. Floro, G. K., "Continuity in City Manager Ca- 
reers," American Journal of Sociology, 61 (1955), 
240-46. 
11. Fuchs, V. R., ed. Production and Productivity in the 
Service Industries, Studies in Income and Wealth, 
No. 34 (New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1969). 
12. Kammerer, G. M., et. al. City Mangers in Politics: 
An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination, 
University of Florida Monographs in the Social 
Sciences, 13, (1962). 
13. Liebert, R., "Municipal Functions, Structure and 
Expenditures: A Reanalysis of Recent Research," 
Social Science Quarterly, 54(1974), 765-783. 
14. Lewellen, W. G. and Huntsman, B., "Managerial 
Pay and Corporate Performance," American Eco- 
nomic Review, 60 (1970), 710-721. 
15. Loveridge, R. O. City Managers in Legislative Poli- 
tics (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 
1971). 
16. Masson, R. T., "Executive Motivations, Earnings 
and Consequent Equity Performance," Journal of 
Political Economy, 79 (1971), 1278-1293. 
17. McKean, R. N., "Property Rights Within Govern- 
ment and Devices to Increase Governmental Effi- 
ciency," Southern Economic Journal, 39(1972), pp. 
177-186. 
18. Moss, Milton, ed. The Measurement of Economic 
and Social Performance, Studies in Income and 
Wealth, No. 38 (New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1973). 
19. Niskanen, W. A. Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government, (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971). 
20. Schmandt, H. J. and Stephens, G. R., "Measuring 
Municipal Output," National Tax Journal, 13 
(1960), 369-375. 
21. Sharkansky, I. Public Administration (Chicago: 
Markham, 1970). 
22. Theil, H. Principles of Econometrics (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971). 
23. Tullock, G. The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washing- 
ton, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965). 
24. Votey, H. L. and Phillips, L., "Police Effectiveness 
and the Production Function for Law Enforce- 
ment," Journal of Legal Studies, 1(1973), 423-436. 
